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Mannheim, Germany
Our understanding of the mechanisms underlying social conformity has recently
advanced due to the employment of neuroscience methodology and novel experimental
approaches. Most prominently, several studies have demonstrated the role of
neural reinforcement-learning processes in conformal adjustments using a specifically
designed and frequently replicated paradigm. Only very recently, the validity of the
critical behavioral effect in this very paradigm was seriously questioned, as it invites
the unwanted contribution of regression toward the mean. Using a straightforward
control-group design, we corroborate this recent finding and demonstrate the
involvement of statistical distortions. Additionally, however, we provide conclusive
evidence that the paradigm nevertheless captures behavioral effects that can only be
attributed to social influence. Finally, we present a mathematical approach that allows to
isolate and quantify the paradigm’s true conformity effect both at the group level and for
each individual participant. These data as well as relevant theoretical considerations
suggest that the groundbreaking findings regarding the brain mechanisms of social
conformity that were obtained with this recently criticized paradigm were indeed valid.
Moreover, we support earlier suggestions that distorted behavioral effects can be
rectified by means of appropriate correction procedures.
Keywords: social influence, conformity, deviance, regression toward the mean, social neuroscience
Introduction
Social inﬂuence clearly is one of the classic issues of social psychological research (Asch, 1955;
Crutchﬁeld, 1955). Adding to a vast body of behavioral studies on its mechanisms and nature
(Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004), scholars have recently begun to investigate it using neuroscientiﬁc
methodology (Falk et al., 2012; Izuma, 2013; Cascio et al., 2015). In particular, various studies
have broadened the perspective on conformity (i.e., aligning one’s judgments to those of others),
providing insight that is valuable both for the brain sciences and for social psychology (Schnuerch
and Gibbons, 2014). To study the neurophysiological principles of conformity, several studies have
implemented innovative designs that allow to investigate the perception of one’s deviance from
descriptive social norms and the inﬂuence of this deviance on subsequent individual judgment
(Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Zaki et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Shestakova et al., 2013; Huang et al.,
2014; Nook and Zaki, 2015). Using a speciﬁcally developed paradigm (Klucharev et al., 2009), it
was shown, and repeatedly replicated, that majority inﬂuence involves the general neural principles
of reinforcement learning (Falk et al., 2012): detecting one’s agreement with the majority leads to
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patterns of activity typically observed in reward processing, while
perceiving one’s deviance from the group entails neural responses
associated with error and punishment processing (Klucharev
et al., 2009, 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013; Stallen et al., 2013).
Only very recently, the experimental approach that was used
in most of the studies on the reinforcement-learning principles
of social conformity has been called into question as it evidently
invites the contribution of regression toward the mean (RTM;
Yu and Chen, 2015). In the typical paradigm (Klucharev et al.,
2009), participants rated the attractiveness of a series of faces on
a Likert scale and saw, after each of their own ratings, how an
ostensible group of others had previously rated the respective
face. Thus, participants learned about the possible discrepancy
(or agreement) between their own and the group’s ratings. In a
surprise retest session, 30min after the initial session, participants
were later asked to rate all faces again, this time without any
feedback about group judgment. Participants’ second ratings
severely decreased for images that the group had previously rated
less favorably than they themselves, and ratings greatly increased
when group judgment had been above their own, which is taken
as evidence of conformity to descriptive group norms.
However, as discussed in detail only recently by Yu and
Chen (2015), the experimentally manipulated ostensible group
judgment can only deviate upward (i.e., be higher than the
individual’s) when participants’ initial ratings are suﬃciently
low. Also, group judgment can only deviate downward (i.e.,
be lower than the individual’s) when initial ratings are high.
Thus, the independent variable that is assumed to elicit the
behavioral eﬀect is severely constrained. More speciﬁcally, group
deviation from individual judgment is confounded with the level
of the initial rating. Unfortunately, the level of an initial rating
has its own substantial eﬀect on the repetition of this rating,
as measurements above or below the mean tend to regress
in the opposite direction to approach the mean (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974; Cutter, 1976; Blomqvist, 1987; Stigler, 1997;
Pezdek and Eddy, 2001). Thus, what is interpreted as an eﬀect
of the individual’s deviance from the group might actually reﬂect
the fact that initially extreme ratings were simply less extreme
during a second assessment: high ratings, typically followed by
lower group judgment, decrease toward the mean by default
(and this direction just so happens to be the direction of the
group’s deviating judgment). Likewise, low initial ratings, most
frequently followed by higher group judgments, naturally regress
to be higher in a second assessment (Yu and Chen, 2015).
Using an elegant experimental approach, Yu and Chen (2015)
demonstrated RTM in the deviance-based conformity paradigm
(Klucharev et al., 2009). Yu and Chen (2015) showed that the
same eﬀect typically observed in this paradigm occurred even
in the complete absence of the seemingly critical manipulation.
After each of participants’ judgments, they determined the
group’s judgment, yet did not show it to the participant, who
merely rated all faces and was later asked to rate them all again.
Crucially, conformal adjustment as a function of participants’
“previous deviance” was found, even though this deviance was
completely unbeknownst to the participants. This eﬀect vanished
when the level of participants’ initial ratings was controlled for.
According to Yu and Chen (2015), this clearly demonstrates that
RTM caused the eﬀect that would have been attributed to the
social-feedback manipulation under normal conditions.
This recent study by Yu and Chen (2015) exempliﬁes
the need for careful methodological considerations and, more
speciﬁcally, the necessity to control for RTM. As acknowledged
by the authors, though, their study does not clarify whether
the deviance-based conformity paradigm indeed captures true
conformity eﬀects. Even though the sham-manipulation eﬀect
indicates that the paradigm evokes a notable RTM-induced eﬀect
(Yu and Chen, 2015), it is still conceivable that RTM added to
the actual social-inﬂuence eﬀect rather than accounting for the
entire behavioral eﬀect. There is indeed evidence indicating that
this might be the case. Regression eﬀects were controlled for using
post hoc procedures in previous studies (such as removing trials
from the analysis or adding initial ratings as covariates in the
analysis), and an eﬀect of deviance from the group on subsequent
rating changes still emerged (Zaki et al., 2011; Huang et al.,
2014; Nook and Zaki, 2015). In all of these studies, the authors
controlled for the level of the initial rating, as similarly proposed
by Yu and Chen (2015).
One might argue that roughly controlling for the level of
the initial rating is not the ultimate way to investigate possible
remainders of the social-inﬂuence eﬀect in the deviance-based
paradigm. In fact, one should consider the possibility that
leveling initial judgments or removing extreme ones distorts
the measurement of conformity if conformity itself is not
independent of the level of one’s initial rating. For example, a
special property of the deviance-based paradigm might be that
participants attend vigilantly to the following group judgment
whenever they have just given a rather extreme initial rating. In
such situations, social proof would seem particularly desirable
to the person. Increased attention to the group judgment on a
particular trial, however, will likely entail a greater conformal
adjustment. A conformity estimate that is based solely or
mainly on moderate initial ratings might therefore lead to an
underestimation of the social-conformity eﬀect. Whatever the
actual mechanisms, if not only RTM, but also conformity is
systematically related to the level of the initial ratings, any post
hoc correction procedure that completely purges the inﬂuence of
the initial rating would be inaccurate. Consequently, alternative
strategies for correction should be tested.
There is general consensus that the best approach to
controlling for RTM when taking measures repeatedly is to
include a control group (Barnett, 2004; Yu and Chen, 2015).
By assessing whether the eﬀect in an experimental group, in
which the regular manipulation is used, exceeds the eﬀect in a
control group, in which a sham manipulation is used that leads
to the same degree of RTM, yet does not contain the crucial
social-inﬂuence manipulation (Yu and Chen, 2015), one can
assess indubitably whether there is a true conformity eﬀect. In
the present study, we therefore implemented a straightforward
and highly expedient control-group design for the ﬁrst time in
this line of research.
In addition to clarifying whether there is a conformity eﬀect
in the deviance-based paradigm at the group level, we would like
to introduce a practical approach that might allow us to quantify
and remove this eﬀect at the level of the individual participant.
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More precisely, we propose a novel strategy by which the control
group can be used to correct for RTM in the experimental
group. Based on the results from the control group, one can
carefully assess how rating changes carried by natural RTM
can be predicted on the basis of initial ratings. It is reasonable
to assume that initial ratings are related to subsequent RTM
(Zaki et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2014; Yu and Chen, 2015). We
posit that the exact inﬂuence of initial ratings on subsequent
RTM should be quantiﬁed in a control-group design. Applying
hierarchical linear modeling to the data of the control group, one
can determine an equation and parameters that allow to predict
for each follow-up rating the change in rating that is expected due
to RTM alone. Subsequently, one can apply this model to the data
in the experimental group to estimate an RTM-corrected rating
change for each item in each participant.
It should be noted that such a minute correction procedure is
useful for several reasons. First, it allows to subsequently assess a
corrected conformity score for each participant. In neuroscience
research, it is often of vital interest to correlate physiological
and behavioral eﬀects across participants (Klucharev et al., 2009;
Shestakova et al., 2013; Schnuerch et al., 2014; Nook and Zaki,
2015). Likewise, studies on the role of genetics in social inﬂuence
essentially depend on valid measures of individual conformal
adjustment (see Falk et al., 2012). Second, conformity research
has typically focused on investigating moderators of socially
inﬂuenced behavior, such as the nature of the object that is
being judged (see, e.g., Spears et al., 2009) or its ambiguity
(see, e.g., Germar et al., 2014). As long as the observed eﬀects
in the deviance-based paradigm are artiﬁcially inﬂated by a
distortion that should be similar across diﬀerent conditions,
it is particularly diﬃcult to uncover or quantify any such
diﬀerences, even if they do exist. Therefore, we believe that there
is ample reason to explore and discuss possible procedures that
allow not only to pinpoint, but also to quantify and correct
for the unwanted contribution of RTM (Yu and Chen, 2015).
Consequently, a corrected, and thus more precise, estimate of
each participant’s behavioral tendency to conform is pivotal. The
approach proposed in the present paper allows to derive such an
approximation to a carefully corrected conformity score in the
deviance-based paradigm.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifty-four female undergraduates from the University of Bonn
(mean age: 22 years) participated in exchange for course credit.
Prior to participation, they gave written informed consent.
As in previous studies, only females were run to focus on
within-gender, rather than more mating-related, attractiveness
judgments (Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013).
All procedures were approved by the local ethics committee.
Stimuli and Apparatus
A total of 180 photographs of female faces were presented over
the course of the experiment. The images were taken from
the same collection that was previously used in very similar
investigations (Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Zaki et al., 2011;
Shestakova et al., 2013). All faces were presented individually
with a six-point rating scale placed below the image. The
experiment was programmed and run on Presentation software
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Berkeley, CA, USA). All data were
processed and analyzed on R (R Core Team, 2014).
Procedure
We adapted the paradigm developed by Klucharev et al. (2009)
and combined it with the approach of Yu and Chen (2015).
While one group of randomly selected participants performed the
regular task (Experimental Group), the other half did not see any
group feedback and merely rated all images twice, in two separate
sessions (Control Group). All participants were informed that
they took part in a study on the processing of facial beauty and
were asked to rate a series of portraits of females. Participants in
the Experimental Group were additionally told that they would
see “group feedback” directly after each of their own ratings,
namely the rounded average assessment of the current face as
given by a group of previous participants. For each participant,
the experiment consisted of two major parts (ﬁrst and second
rating session), each of which comprised 180 trials.
As depicted in Figure 1, in the ﬁrst part (initial ratings),
participants judged the attractiveness of the female faces on a
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not attractive at all) to 6 (very
attractive). Participants saw each face and entered their rating
by keypress. The response was visualized by a blue square
surrounding the corresponding number on the scale depicted
below the face. In the Control Group, this display remained
on-screen for the next 3500 ms. In the Experimental Group,
however, a red square, marking the response of an ostensible
group of previous participants, appeared around another or the
same number on the scale after 1500 ms. Above the square,
a small number indicated the degree of deviation between
individual and group judgment. The to-be-evaluated face was
constantly shown above the scale and the squares. The whole
display was shown for 2000 ms, after which the next trial
commenced with a ﬁxation cross. Thus, the same time elapsed
between participants’ ratings and the next trial in both groups.
Also, the display was almost identical, except for the additional
square and the small number indicating the group’s response and
deviation in the Experimental Group.
Deviation was experimentally manipulated to be −2, −1, +1,
or+2 (30 times each) or 0 (60 times), in randomized order.When
the summation of the initial individual rating and the currently
drawn group deviation resulted in a number smaller than one
or larger than six, the drawn deviation ∗ (−1) was presented
instead. For example, when a participant rated a face as a 5 and
+2 was drawn as group deviation, group judgment seven was not
shown. Instead, a downward deviation of the same size (−2) was
chosen, such that three would be presented. The same approach
was employed in previous studies (Kim et al., 2012; Schnuerch
et al., 2014). To test the mock eﬀect of (invisible) feedback in the
Control Group (Yu and Chen, 2015), deviation of the group was
determined in each trial in this group just as in the Experimental
Group. It was, however, suppressed, such that no actual social
manipulation was presented.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic illustration of the structure of trials in the first
and second part of the experiment in the Experimental Group. In the
Control Group, everything was the same, except that, during the first part,
the red frame and number indicating the group’s judgment and its deviation
from individual judgment were never shown. Note that this is for
demonstration purposes only; different portraits were shown and details are
not drawn to scale. Photographs courtesy of David Niblack (www.
imagebase.net).
In the previously unannounced second part (follow-up
ratings), participants rated all 180 faces for a second time in a
newly randomized order. Each face was presented for 1000 ms,
until it was replaced by an interrogation point prompting
participants to enter their rating, which was visualized for 500 ms
by a blue square surrounding the respective number. No group
feedback was presented in this part.
Data Analysis
Prior to all analyses, we mean-centered all ratings separately
for each individual and each rating session (ﬁrst and second
rating) to correct for typical displacements across separate
sessions (Sharot et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2014; Schnuerch
et al., 2014; Yu and Chen, 2015). That is, for a given
participant, the mean of all of this participant’s ratings in
a given session (ﬁrst or second) was subtracted from each
of this participant’s ratings in this session. Subsequently, we
assessed rating changes as the diﬀerence between the second
and ﬁrst mean-centered rating of each image. The resulting
set of 180 rating changes per participant (based on one initial
and one follow-up assessment for a total of 180 images) was
investigated. As in previous investigations (Klucharev et al.,
2009; Zaki et al., 2011; Shestakova et al., 2013; Nook and Zaki,
2015), large and medium deviations were collapsed, reducing
the ﬁve-level factor to a factor Deviation with levels peers
lower (deviations −2 and −1), peers equal (deviation 0), and
peers higher (deviations +1 and +2). Individual rating changes
were submitted to an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with
repeated-measures factor Deviation (peers lower, peers equal,
peers higher) and between-subjects factor Group (experimental
vs. control).
For all ANOVAs, we report generalized eta-squared (η2G) as a
measure of eﬀect size (Olejnik and Algina, 2003; Bakeman, 2005).
Whenever a test of sphericity indicated that the variances of
diﬀerences between conditions were not homogeneous (Mauchly,
1940), degrees of freedom were corrected by means of the
procedure proposed by Greenhouse and Geisser (1959), and
uncorrected values and the correction factor ε are reported. For
t-tests, Cohen’s d is reported as eﬀect size.
The proposed correction procedure is based on a hierarchical
linear model (see Rationale and Derivation of the Correction
Formula), which was analyzed using R packages lme4 and
lmerTest (Bates et al., 2014; Kuznetsova et al., 2014). Degrees
of freedom were based on the Satterthwaite approximation
(Satterthwaite, 1946).
Results
Effect of Deviation on Rating Changes
In a preliminary analysis, we conﬁrmed the successful
randomization of participants’ assignment to the groups
(Experimental vs. Control) by comparing their raw (i.e.,
untransformed) initial ratings. As expected, initial ratings did
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between groups [Control: M = 3.087,
SD= 0.403; Experimental:M = 3.198, SD= 0.422; t(52)= 0.992,
p = 0.326, d = 0.269].
In both groups, rating changes depended on the [previously
presented (Experimental Group) or drawn, but not presented
(Control Group)] deviation of group judgment from individual
judgment, as shown by a main eﬀect of Deviation on
rating changes [F(2,104) = 80.045, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.590,
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ε = 0.794]. This eﬀect was further modulated by the group,
as indicated by the signiﬁcant interaction Deviation × Group
[F(2,104) = 13.077, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.190, ε = 0.794]. To
assess the size of the group-level eﬀect for each group, we
performed separate follow-up ANOVAs. As expected, the eﬀect
of Deviation on rating changes was larger in the Experimental
Group [F(2,52) = 52.777, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.658, ε = 0.768]
than in the Control Group [F(2,52) = 28.562, p < 0.001,
η2G = 0.497, ε = 0.822]. As the two groups diﬀered only in
regard to the social-deviance manipulation, while most likely
containing the same degree of RTM, there must have been an
eﬀect of this manipulation that exceeded the mere RTM eﬀect in
the Experimental Group. Figures 2A,B display descriptives for
the two groups.
Correcting Individual Rating Changes
Rationale and Derivation of the Correction Formula
One key advantage of the control-group design is the possibility
of assessing an item-level estimate for RTM in the given
paradigm. As will be demonstrated in the following, this allows to
assess a corrected conformity score for each participant. Previous
research has provided empirical support for the theoretical
assumption that, as per RTM, initial ratings should strongly aﬀect
follow-up ratings, and thus rating changes (Zaki et al., 2011;
Huang et al., 2014; Nook and Zaki, 2015; Yu and Chen, 2015).
We argue that this fact (i.e., the natural inﬂuence of an initial
rating regarding a given item on the follow-up rating of this very
item) can be used to estimate more precisely, for each participant
and each item, the to-be-expected rating change that is carried
by RTM alone. [Note that we refer to items, rather than trials:
although each participant performed a total of 360 trials, exactly
180 independent items (images) were rated twice, such that the
initial rating, the follow-up rating, and the rating change are
registered and available for analysis for each of these 180 items].
The general approach of our correction procedure is
based upon the idea that the Control Group, in which no
social-inﬂuence manipulation was presented, is ideal to assess
the isolated RTM eﬀect of initial ratings on subsequent rating
changes. From the Control Group one can derive a hierarchical
linear model that allows to predict rating changes on the
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FIGURE 2 | Effects of the social-deviance manipulation on
individual judgment at the group level and for each participant.
(A) Rating changes as a function of the deviation of group judgment
from participants’ initial judgment in the Experimental Group, that is,
when group judgment is actually presented. (B) Rating changes as a
function of preceding group deviation in the Control Group, that is,
when no group judgment is ever shown. (C) Corrected rating changes
as a function of preceding group deviation in the Experimental Group.
The correction was performed using the formula presented in Section
“Rationale and Derivation of the Correction Formula.” (D) Corrected
rating changes as a function of preceding group deviation in the
Control Group. The correction was performed using the formula
presented in Section “Rationale and Derivation of the Correction
Formula.” (E) Individual conformal tendencies for all participants in the
Experimental Group, shown as uncorrected and corrected conformity
scores. Conformity scores are Fisher-z-transformed within-subject
correlations between the group’s deviation and (corrected or
uncorrected) rating changes (see Application of the Correction Formula
for details). Error bars in all panels (A–E) depict the 95% confidence
interval of the mean.
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basis of initial ratings. This model can then be applied to the
Experimental Group in order to estimate the expected rating
change caused by the level of the initial rating (i.e., RTM).
Finally, one can subtract this estimate of the RTM-based rating
change from each rating change in order to arrive at a corrected
rating-change estimate per item that captures only the inﬂuence
of group deviation.
To give a brief overview beforehand, we will present two
equations that describe how RTM-predicting parameters can
be estimated based on the behavior observed in the Control
Group (with participants always indexed by k). The third
equation describes how the previously estimated parameters can
be applied to the data observed in the Experimental Group (with
participants always indexed by x) to predict behavior that should
be driven by social inﬂuence without the contribution of RTM.
To account for the hierarchical data structure (all 180
items are nested within each participant), we implemented a
random-coeﬃcient model (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). By use
of a hierarchical linear model such as this, we can analyze the
data within each participant (Level 1) as well as diﬀerences
between participants (Level 2). Therefore, the rating change for
each item i of each Control-Group participant k is entered as the
dependent variable of the Level-1 model (item level), which can
be formulated as
cik = β0k + β1krik + εik (1)
where cik is the observed rating change, rik is the mean-centered
initial rating for item i of Control-Group participant k, β0k
represents the individual intercept of participant k, β1k denotes
the unstandardized eﬀect of the ﬁrst rating on rating change
for participant k, and εik represents the normally distributed
residual term for item i of participant k, with εik ∼N(0, σ2ε).
In a hierarchical linear model, regression coeﬃcients are allowed
to vary between participants (random coeﬃcients), so that
each participant practically has their own regression equation.
These individual diﬀerences are further addressed in Level-2
models. Since the independent variable rik is mean-centered
within participants, the individual intercept β0k denotes the
mean of the dependent variable cik for each participant (Bryk
and Raudenbush, 1992). As cik is the diﬀerence between two
mean-centered variables (i.e., follow-up and initial rating), it
follows that β0k is zero for all participants. Thus, our model is
in fact a random-slope, ﬁxed-intercept model with β0k = β0 = 0.
The Level-2 model (participant level) describes the random
slope of the Level-1 model as a function of an average eﬀect and a
normally distributed random error:
β1k = γ10 + δ1k (2)
where β1k is the slope of participant k, γ10 is the average slope
across participants, and δ1k is the individual deviation from that
mean associated with participant k, with δ1k ∼N(0, σ2δ). Model
analysis based on the hierarchical linear model as speciﬁed above
includes the estimation of ﬁxed coeﬃcients on both levels (i.e.,
β0 and γ10) as well as residual variances on both levels (i.e., σ2ε
and σ2δ).
As expected, the ﬁxed eﬀect of initial rating, that is, the
average slope across participants, was a strong and signiﬁcant
predictor of rating changes in the Control Group [γ10 = −0.374,
SE= 0.019, F(1,26.283)= 377.830, p< 0.001]. The random-eﬀect
analysis of initial rating revealed that the observed slope diﬀered
only slightly between participants (σ2δ = 0.007). RTM-induced
rating changes per item for each participant in the Experimental
Group can now be estimated by weighting the initial rating
with the extracted average slope γ10. As the total (i.e., observed)
rating change for each trial is assumed to be the sum of the
RTM-induced rating change and the social-inﬂuence-induced
rating change, the part of the rating change that is due to the
social-inﬂuence manipulation can be approximated for each item
i in each Experimental-Group participant x as follows:
sˆix = cix − γ10rix (3)
where sˆix is the predicted social-inﬂuence-induced rating change
(i.e., rating change adjusted for RTM), cix is the observed rating
change, γ10 is the previously determined regression coeﬃcient
(i.e., the average slope) for the mean-centered initial rating (see
Equation 2), and rix is the mean-centered initial rating.
Application of the Correction Formula
The above-mentioned model can now be applied to the data
in the Experimental Group to correct all rating changes at the
level of individual items. Subsequently, items can be aggregated
for each deviation condition in each participant, and group-level
analyses can be performed in the same way as it is usually done
with the uncorrected values to assess the overall eﬀect of the
manipulation. Such an analysis yields an approximation to the
group-level social-inﬂuence eﬀect without the contribution of
RTM. For the Experimental Group in the present study, the
repeated-measures ANOVA with dependent variable corrected
rating change (as described for the uncorrected values in Section
“Eﬀect of Deviation on Rating Changes”) revealed a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the 3-level factor Deviation on corrected rating changes
[F(2,52) = 11.114, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.297, ε = 0.792].
Holm-corrected pairwise comparisons (Holm, 1979) revealed
that rating changes were lower (i.e., more negative) in the
peers-lower as compared to the peers-agree condition (p= 0.037)
and compared to the peers-higher condition (p = 0.001). Also,
rating changes were higher in the peers-higher than in the
peers-agree condition (p = 0.008). Although based on a more
minute correction procedure, this conﬁrms previous ﬁndings
indicating that a signiﬁcant conformity eﬀect emerges in this
paradigm, even when the unwanted contribution of RTM is
controlled for (Zaki et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2014; Nook and
Zaki, 2015; Yu and Chen, 2015). Descriptives at the group level
are shown in Figure 2C.
Additionally, we scrutinized our own approach by applying
it to all rating changes in the Control Group as well. The
previously reported eﬀect of the invisible deviation on rating
changes in the Control Group (see Eﬀect of Deviation on
Rating Changes) can only represent RTM. If the proposed
correction algorithm indeed isolates and subducts the
contribution of RTM to rating changes, applying it to
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the Control Group should thus completely eliminate the
eﬀect. A repeated-measures ANOVA with dependent variable
social-inﬂuence-incuded rating change in the Control Group
revealed that there was no longer a signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of Deviation, [F(2,52) = 0.273, p = 0.762, η2G = 0.010]. As
expected, the correction procedure thus exposes a remaining
social-inﬂuence eﬀect in the Experimental Group (see
Figure 2C), while no such eﬀect is observed in the Control
Group (see Figure 2D).
To estimate individual RTM-corrected social-inﬂuence eﬀects,
we modiﬁed an approach that was previously implemented
in the deviance-based conformity paradigm (Klucharev et al.,
2009; Nook and Zaki, 2015): for each participant separately, we
assessed across all items the Pearson’s r correlation coeﬃcient
for the association between (a) the group’s deviation from
the individual [−2, −1, 0, +1, +2] and (b) subsequent
rating change. The resulting raw coeﬃcients were transformed
to Fisher-z scores to guarantee a normal distribution of
the values and allow comparison of the estimates (Fisher,
1921; Nook and Zaki, 2015). Crucially, we performed this
analysis twice, using two diﬀerent variables for (b): the
unmodiﬁed rating changes as they were observed [c], and
the estimates of the RTM-corrected rating change attributable
to social inﬂuence [sˆ], computed using the formula depicted
in Equation 3. The ﬁrst correlation provides the uncorrected
conformity score for each participant, whereas the second
one provides the corrected conformity score. Based on our
hierarchical model analysis in the Control Group, γ10 was set
to −0.374 (see Rationale and Derivation of the Correction
Formula).
Uncorrected and corrected conformity scores for all
participants are depicted in Figure 2E. Note that the degree of
correction obviously varies between participants. However, this
is one of the strengths of the item-based approach: if a person’s
initial ratings scatter widely around their average (e.g., ratings
1 and 6 are used most frequently), then much RTM is highly
likely and, thus, a strong correction of subsequent ratings is
necessary. If a person’s initial ratings have only a very limited
variance (e.g., only ratings 3 and 4 are used), then RTM occurs
only rarely and is rather small, such that the correction should be
minimal.
Uncorrected scores ranged from 0.085 to 0.370, with amean of
0.235 (SD = 0.078). Across participants, uncorrected conformity
scores were signiﬁcantly larger than zero [t(26) = 15.645,
p < 0.001, d = 3.013]. RTM-corrected conformity scores ranged
from −0.023 to 0.289, with a mean score of 0.100 (SD = 0.084).
As expected, uncorrected and corrected scores were strongly
correlated [r(27) = 0.802, p < 0.001], and corrected scores were
signiﬁcantly smaller than uncorrected scores [t(26) = 14.166,
p < 0.001, d = 2.726]. However, the corrected scores were
still signiﬁcantly larger than zero [t(26) = 5.885, p < 0.001,
d = 1.190], which is consistent with the results from the
initial comparison between Experimental and Control Group
(see Eﬀect of Deviation on Rating Changes) and the group-level
ANOVA on social-inﬂuence-induced rating changes (i.e., rating
changes corrected according to Equation 3) in the Experimental
Group.
Discussion
In the present study, we investigated the nature of the behavioral
eﬀects in the experimental paradigm that is frequently used to
study the reinforcement-learning principles of social conformity
(Klucharev et al., 2009, 2011; Zaki et al., 2011; Kim et al.,
2012; Shestakova et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2014; Nook
and Zaki, 2015). Our study is thus a continuation of very
recent methodological investigations that demonstrated that the
paradigm measures a behavioral eﬀect that is most likely carried
by RTM (Yu and Chen, 2015). We aimed to (i) investigate
carefully whether the paradigm nevertheless yields a behavioral
eﬀect that must be attributed to social inﬂuence rather than
RTM, and (ii) develop a correction procedure that allows to
correct the measure of conformity at the level of the individual
participant.
Previously employed post hoc corrections (Zaki et al., 2011;
Huang et al., 2014), as well as the modulating eﬀects of
additional social variables on the compound behavioral eﬀect
(Klucharev et al., 2009), indicate that the paradigm indeed
captures true conformity eﬀects. To verify and extend these
ﬁndings, we employed, for the ﬁrst time in this line of research,
the best approach to controlling for RTM (Barnett, 2004;
Yu and Chen, 2015): a straightforward control-group design.
As expected, we found that the regular paradigm yields a
behavioral eﬀect that exceeds the eﬀect that is solely carried by
RTM.
The present ﬁndings thus invigorate the interpretation of
previous work based on the deviance-based paradigm (Klucharev
et al., 2009). Admittedly, the brain mechanisms revealed via this
approach were mostly independent of the behavioral eﬀects, as
they referred to the process of deviance detection (Klucharev
et al., 2009, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Shestakova et al., 2013;
Huang et al., 2014) and to the altered representation of value
(Zaki et al., 2011). Thus, the unwanted contribution of RTM,
which is a phenomenon that pertains to the ratings during the
second rating session, rather than to the processing of social
deviance or an item’s value, might be seen as somewhat detached
from the neural ﬁndings. However, from a general theoretical
and scientiﬁc point of view, it has been strongly advised that
neuroscience research base its conclusion about the physiological
mechanisms underlying psychological processes upon ﬁrm and
valid behavioral eﬀects (Amodio, 2010). According to this view,
it is quintessential to the interpretation of any neuroscientiﬁc
ﬁndings based on this paradigm that the experimental setup
indeed evokes the assumed psychological eﬀects of social
inﬂuence that register at the behavioral level. The present study,
in line with previous post hoc correction approaches (Zaki et al.,
2011; Huang et al., 2014; Nook and Zaki, 2015), strongly supports
this assumption by demonstrating that RTM accounts merely
for part of the behavioral eﬀect. The paradigm measures not
only unwanted statistical distortions, but also a substantial and
relevant aspect of human social behavior. Thus, the novel and
intriguing insight into the neural principles of social inﬂuence
obtained in this paradigm (Klucharev et al., 2009; Zaki et al.,
2011; Kim et al., 2012; Shestakova et al., 2013) was based upon a
task that indeed induces social inﬂuence and captures conformal
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adjustments. This is particularly noteworthy as these
neurophysiological ﬁndings have received much attention
and are seen as highly relevant advances in social-inﬂuence
research as well as social and decision neuroscience in general
(Rilling and Sanfey, 2011; Falk et al., 2012; Schnuerch and
Gibbons, 2014; Cascio et al., 2015). Clearly, they have broadened
our perspective on social inﬂuence and the mechanisms of
the social brain (Klucharev et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2012).
The present study substantiates these claims and advances
previous methodological caveats (Yu and Chen, 2015) by
demonstrating that these groundbreaking ﬁndings derived from
an experimental setting that clearly instigates the targeted
psychological processes.
Importantly, the present work does not only aﬀect the
interpretation of previous results, but it also adds to the list of
potential correction procedures that were recently proposed (Yu
and Chen, 2015) and thus contributes to the improvement of
any further implementation of this paradigm. We have presented
a feasible mathematical approach by which the size of the
true conformity eﬀect can be determined for each participant
individually. While still allowing an enhanced estimation of the
group-level eﬀect, this mainly opens the possibility of relating
the eﬀect to external variables across participants. In fact,
several scholars using this paradigm did not ﬁnd correlations
between the behavioral eﬀect and neural eﬀects across or within
participants (Kim et al., 2012; Shestakova et al., 2013; Huang et al.,
2014). We speculate that this null eﬀect might in part be due
to the fact that the behavioral measure was an overestimation
partly carried by RTM. A cleaner measure of conformity,
as proposed in the present study, might turn out to allow
ﬁnding such relations. This could be particularly relevant for
further investigations into the reinforcement-learning principles
of conformity, which often involve an individual-diﬀerences
perspective (Falk et al., 2012). Relating a person’s genetic
disposition or their brain activity to behavioral measures of
conformity is useful in uncovering the biological foundations
of this ubiquitous behavior (Falk et al., 2012, 2014). If the
innovative and clearly beneﬁcial deviance-based paradigm is
implemented as part of this endeavor, carefully corrected
behavioral measures at the level of the individual participant are
mandatory. The present study proposes a novel strategy how to
do this.
The rationale of the proposed correction approach is
straightforward, as it builds upon the ideas of a compound eﬀect
that can be rectiﬁed and the possibility of deriving a means
to predict RTM-induced behavioral changes in this paradigm.
Importantly, the procedure targets the lowest level of information
in this paradigm, which is the initial and follow-up ratings
for each given item. Using the control group as a separate
sample to derive an estimate that allows to predict RTM-induced
rating changes for each to-be-rated item, one can subtract the
inﬂuence of RTM from all rating changes in the experimental
group. The remaining rating changes are a valid approximation
to the actual modulation of individual judgment due to social
inﬂuence. Crucially, all information that is necessary to generate
a prediction model and apply this for correction is at hand:
only initial and follow-up ratings in a control group and an
experimental group are needed to perform this correction.
Finally, it should be noted that the correction procedure
proposed in the present paper would beneﬁt from further testing.
Additional experimental investigations, as well as simulation
studies, could provide more certainty as to the accuracy of the
approach. Although its general notion is rather straightforward,
the procedure builds upon assumptions that could be scrutinized
to test its validity and stability. For example, we assume that
RTM is independent of the critical manipulation (i.e., deviation
in the present study), such that any eﬀect observed in the
control group is a valid proxy for the expected RTM eﬀect in
the experimental group. While this seems plausible (see Barnett,
2004), empirical evidence supporting this assumption would
increase the conﬁdence in the procedure’s potency. The basic
conditions (e.g., sample sizes, response variability, and scale use)
could be manipulated in order to test whether the procedure
introduced and tested in this paper is robust to such variations
and remains useful under diﬀerent premises.
Conclusion
The present study represents a relevant addition to the recently
voiced concerns about the deviance-based conformity paradigm
(Yu and Chen, 2015). However, beyond clarifying and replicating
the unwanted statistical distortion, we have demonstrated its
limit. The contribution of RTM to the total behavioral eﬀect is
bounded, as revealed by the fact that a substantial social-inﬂuence
eﬀect remained even if RTM was carefully purged. Moreover,
we propose a strategy to estimate conformal tendencies for each
pair of judgments of each participant. We therefore conclude
that the paradigm can indeed be used, as it allows to harvest
the advantage of analyzing behavioral and neural consequences
of detecting agreement and disagreement with one’s judgments.
In fact, the paradigm continues to be implemented in the
social-neuroscience community (Huang et al., 2014; Nook and
Zaki, 2015), which emphasizes the need for a clear understanding
of the paradigm and its pitfalls. However, it is equally important
to recognize the limitations of these problems and develop
appropriate strategies to correct for them.
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